Belfast Threats (1913)
Chapter XL Belfast Threats (1913-14) My book on the Lough Neagh fraud was too "legal" for the popular palate. I spent two years in the Record Offices and…
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Chapter XL
Belfast Threats (1913-14)
My book on the Lough Neagh fraud was too “legal” for the popular palate. I spent two years in the Record Offices and Libraries of Dublin and London compiling it. My purpose was to place the facts on record for the benefit of the fishermen and to vindicate the peers who formed the minority in the House of Lords. Conservative papers, such as the Morning Post and the Daily Telegraph, noticed it handsomely.
The Times (4th September, 1913) greeted it with this accolade:
“Sophristries, insinuations, mere rhetoric, and all kinds of irrelevancies. Prejudice and ignorance are invited to pronounce judgment on what has already been determined by the highest judicial authority… . But no mere list of mistakes could correct the false impressions conveyed by innuendo, assumption, and special pleading. It is simpler to regard the whole book as one vast erratum.”
It is hard to unravel the twisted webs spun centuries ago to deck out fraud in legal raiment. When exposed, it is excused by some as “statecraft.”
I repeated the charges against Burtchaell in 1917 in The Great Fraud of Ulster, and renewed them in a public lecture in Dublin on 2nd December, 1918 (published in 1921). Arraignments accusing a public official of deceiving the courts by a perjured affidavit are unusual, but he made no reply. Now he’s gone “and ta’en his wages.” Had I not been implored not to pursue a man in ill-health, I should have invited the attention of the Attorney-General to his falsehoods.
The Partition Act of 1920 places Lough Neagh within the jurisdiction of “Northern Ireland.” For 14 years my exposures hindered any attempt to interfere with public fishing rights there. In 1925, however, a threatening notice was served on the fishermen, but no decisive legal action seems yet to have been taken.
William O’Brien, in the Cork Free Press, wrote in July, 1913
“This is not the place to estimate in detail the historical value of the materials dug up. What can be affirmed without reserve is that Healy has done more than any man since Lecky to furnish the Irish Gibbon of the future with new light on the most obscure problems of the Ulster Plantation, and with proofs that the Ulster Planters themselves were as grossly defrauded by the thievish Lord Deputy as the O’Neills and O’Donnells.”
None of the courts which decided against the fishermen should be blamed, as they were deceived by an affidavit which went uncontradicted at the time, owing to the unblemished reputation which Burtchaell enjoyed.
When the Marconi scandal broke out I attached importance to it only as food for Party attack.
Sir George Cave made an icy analysis of Lloyd George’s position, which was wonderful in power and balance, and a passionless summary of the facts. It seemed as if he were at the Day of Judgment summing up as counsel against a sinner, but presenting everything that could be said in his favour.
O’Brien urged me to join in the fray, saying it was “the chance of a lifetime.” I refused, because Lloyd George, in spite of gyrations, was mainly on Ireland’s side.
It was regrettable, no doubt, that a Chancellor of the Exchequer should speculate, but was it corrupt? True, Post Office contracts might be made with Marconi, but Sir Herbert Samuel made a fine argument as to that. Yet Sir Edward Grey insisted that both Lloyd George and Rufus Isaacs should apologize to the House.
The Master of Elibank had become a peer, and he also had to ask pardon in the House of Lords. Whether or not the Scribes arraigned the Pharisees, a lesson for Ministers resulted.
When I think of the thousand ways in which Ministers could make money, yet remain untainted, my verdict, after nearly forty years, is that, although the cloistral austerity of Gladstonian days may have been interrupted, the words of Gladstone himself in the case of Lord Bacon come in aid: “The judgment of history should be the judgment of charity.”
After none of my tourneys with Lloyd George could I discern rancour (below skin-depth) in that buoyant Celt.
I wrote my brother:
London,
9th April, 1913.
“I spoke to-night, but didn’t attack Lloyd George, although he deserves mercy from us. I rather exculpated him.
Birrell said to me to-day he was disposed to appoint Moriarty Solicitor-General. He crossed the floor to call me out, and I saw his eye on me while he was talking to Asquith, and knew he was discussing the vacancy.
He began by saying he was tired of duffers, which I sympathized with.
He was frank in saying Chief Baron Palles replied to a request of his for information about Moriarty, and that Judge Ross had written him unasked in Moriarty’s interest. I replied that I had previously consented to Moriarty, but that Campbell feared his Party would attack him. I promised I would not attack Moriarty.
Nevertheless, as he appealed for my view he might blame me if I did not freely discuss the disadvantages. He leant strongly on the Prime Minister’s objection on a former occasion, as to Counsel marrying his client, which I said was no valid objection.
I thought the strongest point which the Opposition could raise was the Bankruptcy, and he said he would inquire into that, yet with such an air that I knew he would gloss it over. Previously I had shown that if what he wanted was an able lawyer he could have one, and advance Moriarty by making him Recorder of Dublin, and appointing O’Shaughnessy to the Law Officership.
To-day he replied that he wanted help, and not the mere advancement of Moriarty.”
Scarcely had Birrell made Moriarty Solicitor-General than a leading English Tory came to me asking, “Where can I find the case of ‘Silke against the National Bank’? ” I replied (as the fact was), “I don’t know.” Apparently nobody could tell him, for he never attacked the appointment. Any lawyer, of course, could find the case in the Digests. It involved an important question in banking law. Moriarty at Doncaster backed a horse with a bookmaker named Silke, winning a few hundred pounds. An objection to the horse was lodged, but Silke gave Moriarty a cheque on the promise that it would not be cashed until the objection to the horse was decided. Moriarty, believing doubtless that the objection would fail, lodged the cheque and drew the money. A day or two later the objection was upheld and Silke sued the Bank for the amount of his cheque, and succeeded. Birrell held a letter from Chief Baron Palles in favour of Moriarty as to this transaction, but I felt uneasy lest it should be raised. I crossed to Dublin, however, to attend a dinner which the Munster Bar gave the new Solicitor-General. On my return to London I wrote Maurice:
House of Commons,
30th May, 1913.
“Lloyd George came to me in the lobby to-day and said he wanted to see me about the payment of members. I replied unless he was prepared to do something upon Land Purchase, or for the Irish Labourers, I could not be squared.
He said he had nothing to do with Land Purchase, and could do nothing about town allotments. “Then,” said I, “we cannot be squared, and we will oppose whatever you do about the Insurance Act.” He said, “I suppose it is no use our discussing the matter?” I answered, “Not the least,” so he left.
Last night we entertained at Gray’s Inn, Maitre Labori, who defended Dreyfus. The Duke of Devonshire was a guest. He told me he was “obsessed with Lismore,” and that his children could not be got away from it.”
House of Commons,
5th June, 1913.
“The Government must be badly hit by the Marconi disclosures. There is malaise over the Liberals.”
About this time George Wyndham died in Paris. It was only a week before that I met him entering the House as I was leaving for Ireland. I have mentioned that he asked me to dine with him, and that, all unconscious of his approaching end, I refused. When he passed away, I wrote:
London,
14th June, 1913.
“I went to George Wyndham’s funeral at Clouds, near Salisbury, yesterday. The family invited me to lunch afterwards, but seeing so many swells present, I made for the railway station. Tears stood in Balfour’s eyes as the sods fell on the coffin.
All the Redmondites went to the Memorial Service at Westminster. O’Brien sent a wreath to the funeral in our eight names.”
House of Commons,
14th July, 1913.
“Lloyd George got the Government draftsman to draw for J. J. O’Shea the amendment to the Budget which he said he would accept from me as to the Reversion Duty clause.
I told the Tories this, and as they had a wider amendment down I am urging them not to let the Bill through on Thursday (as Lloyd George desires) unless their amendment is taken.”
House of Commons,
4th August, 1913.
“In reprisal for the Party’s Opposition to Murphy’s Kingstown Electric Bill I am blocking all private Bills, and have the Party in a hole. They are furious, to my great contentment.
Joyce’s Bill about Limerick was blocked, to his consternation. I did not block it, yet he came to me on Friday interceding. He was so mad that he got Murphy’s solicitor turned out of the lobby, and I immediately reinstated him with great dignity! I am sending a letter to The Times about the Government’s connivance with the Party hacks who spite Murphy.
I spent the week-end at Norwich with Neil Primrose. The Cathedral, which the Duke of Norfolk built there, is one that would do honour to the first city in Europe. It is a glorious building, and the High Mass was sung by 60 choristers.”
The nagging of the “Party” at William Murphy’s enterprises was endless, and the Government connived thereat. He had a Bill to electrify Kingstown, which, when it was through Committee, Redmond got “recommitted,” contrary to the practice of parliament, and then inserted clauses which were an afterthought of the Town Commissioners. These embodied terms of purchase by them, and afterwards proved a boon to Murphy, but a loss to the ratepayers. The electric scheme, taken over by the town at considerable expense, was never set in operation. The Party game of trying to make Murphy a sort of St. Sebastian shot through with arrows was a failure, but it helped to change the course of Irish history.
Chapelizod,
11th September, 1913,
“To The Times review of Stolen Waters I sent enclosed reply. I have knifed the blundering writer.
Did you see Mrs. O’Shea’s son’s attack on William O’Brien? If not, get to-day’s Independent… ”
Soon O’Brien, in his anxiety for the interests of the minority in Ireland, saw Lord Loreburn, the late Lord Chancellor, who published a letter which created a mild sensation. I wrote Maurice:
Chapelizod,
13th September, 1913.
“Lord Loreburn’s letter on the Home Rule Bill pleases the Tories, but cannot lead to much. The Chronicle announcement that there must be a Dissolution between the Royal Assent to the Bill and the “appointed day” is no new doctrine, but is against the Redmondite contention.
We ought to point out the effect of that on the Irish situation which forces us to have two elections within a few months.
As to Mrs. O’Shea’s son’s letter to the Independent about O’Brien, your view that he was brought up in ignorance cannot be correct. Have you forgotten his letter during the divorce case, 1890, about “that awful brute, Parnell,” addressed to his papa?
To seize on O’Brien’s publication to boom a proposed volume by his mother was natural. She might have made thousands out of it any time these 20 years back. The notion, spread by Parnell, that Lockwood prevented him giving evidence is false. Lockwood told me he threatened to throw Parnell out of the window at consultation, when he said he would let the case go by default.
The conception of Parnell as a liar seems not to have occurred to William O’Brien.”
By this time the Belfast opposition to Home Rule had become organized, and Carson threatened bloodshed.
The question of the separation of the Welsh Church from that of Britain was also fiercely fought. The Tories were better led by their chiefs than the Liberals.
I told Maurice:
Chapelizod,
18th September, 1913.
“There is great work at Balmoral. Balfour arrived there to-day. Any compromise on Home Rule must be in the direction of whittling down the Bill.”
Chapelizod,
23rd September, 1913.
“In to-day’s Irish Times there is a remarkable quotation from the London Express, which Aitken controls, saying Home Rule was dished, and that the Government would dissolve. You should get the paper to appreciate this.
Yesterday’s Liverpool Courier (Tory) has an article, sent marked to me, saying that there is to be a Dissolution before anything else, and that this is certain.
Asquith, Grey, Churchill and Lloyd George met in London yesterday.
I therefore wrote to O’Brien culling these facts for his information, but saying I thought Lloyd George dare not consent to anything that would prevent the Welsh Disestablishment Bill becoming law next session, and that this could not be done unless the Home Rule Bin was passed.
I do not see my way through the situation, as put in the two papers. The Express indicates that Ulster was to be cut out, or given a separate Parliament, and Lloyd George and Churchill were always for this. That something is happening is plain.
I told O’Brien that the Carsonites had been to Lord Roberts asking him to lead them, and that it was Roberts recommended General Richardson, who has now commuted his Indian Army pension to escape loss by an Ulster rebellion.
The seriousness of that has struck the Government, who only want an excuse to abandon Home Rule. There is no enthusiasm for it among any of them. The Redmondites will throw the blame on Lord Loreburn if they are “sold” by the Cabinet. I think they will be “sold.”
I had a note from The Times on Friday about the review of Stolen Waters, which I enclose. I sent them the condensation of my answer, which they ask for.
The more I consider the review the more its purpose appears due to the fact that I have grappled with every document of the plaintiff’s title, and have left no point unsmashed.”
Chapelizod,
25th September, 1913.
“I enclose The Times reviewer’s reply, which is beneath contempt. I shall not notice him further. It was unfair not to print my complete letter, but its length provoked this.”
Until The Times review appeared I never conceived that one of its writers would distort facts and dates, or ignore the effect of documents presented before his eyes. Still, it was part of the battle against Home Rule, and Home Rulers had to be discredited.
The Times is to-day freed from intentional unfairness towards Ireland. Even when of old it was hostile, it sometimes picked out Irish artists and soldiers for commendation. In 1881, a Times reporter, a vivid Ulster Tory, named Kernahan, came to me to complain that Parnell, in answer to an attack by Gladstone, had not made the most of some supposed official suggestion during a Chinese war, to “poison the wells.” Kernahan cried out that Parnell, when defending the Land League, forgot this, “but,” he chuckled, “I put it into his speech! ” I often maintained that its parliamentary and law reports (always skilful) deserved a national subsidy.
Chapelizod,
29th September, 1913.
“Redmond’s speech contrasts with that of the Lord-Advocate Ure, who did not speak without Asquith’s authority.
It would be unfair to give Belfast control over education, as Ure Suggests, because Catholics are affected, and the only way Orangemen could be weaned out of their narrowness would be through some generous and truthful ideas penetrating their school-books.”
We scanned at this time the lightest indication relating to the Irish cause. Of course none of us believed in the sincerity of the Government towards Home Rule.
Principle in Liberal politics perished with Gladstone. I wrote Maurice:
Chapelizod,
10th October, 1913.
“Churchill’s speech gives Redmond away. He has not promised what he did two years ago, that there would be a Dissolution between the Royal Assent and the “appointed day” before the Irish Parliament could legislate. This imports a Dissolution at a normal date, and at a time when only 42 members would be returned from Ireland.
As to the exclusion of Ulster, Churchill has promised nothing, unless the House of Lords agree to pass the Bill plus whatever may be engrafted upon it at the next “suggestion “stage. Nothing can be so inserted unless at the request, and with the assent of, the Tories, and as they will consent to nothing, Churchill has merely thrown out a “feeler,” which he knows the Tories won’t accept. Thereby he may have met the King’s scruples by a show of moderation, but this is a dangerous game, and he has inflamed Ulster by acknowledging their grievance and leaving it unremedied, while he chilled the Nationalists.
Redmond evidently has a pledge that the “appointed day” shall be fixed before the Dissolution, and sufficiently early to enable his Executive to be created before the Tories could strike - if they got a majority.”
The Liberal Cabinet had crevices with which we were not acquainted and Ireland, unknown to us, affected the European situation. I wrote:
Chapelizod,
11th October, 1913.
“Both sides are engaged in a struggle for control of the “Sign Manual.” If the King agrees to sign the Home Rule Bill on Churchill’s terms, the Tories are done for. Evidently His Majesty wants an accommodation. Carson’s speech indicates that he regards Churchill’s reference to the Royal Veto not having been exercised for centuries as a cut at His Majesty. I differ, as it was not exercised because the House of Lords would let nothing pass to which the Crown could object, and anything the Lords swallowed the Crown could agree to. Now the position is otherwise, and I think a case can be made by the King for deferring “to the sense of his people” before signing a Bill under the Parliament Act to which a strong opposition has been aroused.
Only for the respect with which F. E. Smith treated Churchill’s speech I should suppose that he was throwing dust into the eyes of the public. English opponents, however, constantly consult together.”
Tory reliance on Royal intervention was then a constant topic of conversation. I told Maurice:
London,
14th October, 1913.
“I hear from a Liberal lawyer (more or less in touch with the law officers) that the King consents to act on the advice of his Ministers. I have not been able to see anyone in touch with the Tories to-day to ascertain what is in their minds, hut to-morrow I may see some of them in the Law Courts.
Redmond’s speech bears out the view I took of Churchill’s. He is safe to promise concessions, because any concession becoming law involves the acceptance of a “suggestion stage” by the House of Lords, and the passage of the Bill by the two Houses in an amended form by consent.”
The possible action of His Majesty was canvassed everywhere, and I again wrote:
London,
16th October, 1913.
“The King, I am told, will not refuse to sign the Home Rule Bill when presented to him. The passage of the measure therefore, in some form, next year is certain. His Majesty has requested both parties to confer, and the Tories will not refuse the invitation.
Carson and his friends will agree to Home Rule for three Provinces, if Ulster is left out, The Government have asked Redmond to consent to some “compromise” over Ulster, and that a compromise will be made seems probable. The Redmondite formula of “No Partition,” and “Ireland one and Indivisible” will vanish. It would be to our interest that the Province should be a unit for such a purpose, as we might get a majority, while it also consorts with Protestant pride that the whole of Ulster should be included, notwithstanding the supposed anxiety of the North for Southern Protestants.
Birrell was dispatched to Dublin on Tuesday to communicate the Cabinet decision to “the boys.” They require an agreement before Asquith speaks on Saturday week. Churchill spoke with Asquith’s approval. Unless Redmond holds out, which is unlikely, it appears as if in the end Home Rule will be passed as a consent measure, with the North cut out.
Labby’s Life publishes my letters in r885 about Gladstone and Chamberlain, but I have not dipped into it yet.”
Redmond and his friends ignored the existence of an extreme party of Nationalists. Small in numbers, but firm in opinion, they hated the Redmond domination. In their minds Redmond’s harvesting a big price for his lands showed insincerity. Underground currents from America also swayed them. Still, the out- break which occurred three years later, due to the Great War, was unforeseen. I wrote Maurice:
London,
20th October, 1913.
“I spent the week-end with Max Aitken and saw Bonar Law, who spoke confidentially on the situation. The Tories are as much in the dark as ourselves as to what is going to happen.
Bonar’s idea is that the Government are fooling Redmond, and that when it comes “to the pinch” Asquith will offer him the alternative of a General Election, or the exclusion of Ulster.
Knox takes a serious view of the feeling in the North, and says their pride will never let them submit to a Catholic Parliament after all that has happened. If there is bloodshed there will be bitter feelings for years, no matter who wins. Knox says the North will never settle down in the way we calculate.
The information I had as to the arguments Asquith used at Balmoral against the use of the Royal Veto was correct, but neither side can predict what will happen. The King is anxious for a compromise, and Tories like P. E. Smith, who is a friend of Winston’s, would be in favour of a “Coalition” ministry in case Redmond refused to exclude Ulster; but there is no prospect of this yet.
The Tories don’t see what they are to gain by an Irish settlement. It would banish their best cry at the next election if they assented to Home Rule. The King advises a Conference, and lets each side know the other’s mind, which is proper and advantageous. I cannot see why O’Brien urges a Conference, which can only end in Ulster being in some way excluded, either administratively, or otherwise.”
It is not enheartening to look back on those days. Yet I am persuaded we did our best.
London,
24th October, 1913.
“Lord Portsmouth called at my chambers to-day. As far as I could judge, it was in order to report my views to Lord Lansdowne.
I think it likely there will be some offer to the Ulstermen, with Redmond’s consent. The latest suggestion was that Ulster should be excluded for the first five years.
I am assured that the King will sign whatever is presented to him in the shape of a Bill, irrespective of consequences. But the Liberals are afraid of bloodshed, and are considering compromise.”
After some months, I told my brother:
London,
15th December, 1913.
“O’Brien has requested me to get an interview for him with Bonar Law. In accordance with his request I arranged the matter, and wired that he could see Bonar any day this week.
Churchill goes about saying he will leave the Cabinet if there is any attempt to coerce Ulster. The Tories know this. So Carson has only to “keep it up”!
The Cabinet are meeting to-day, and Lloyd George thinks the thing to do is to make an offer that will look well for the country, and be refused. They propose to exclude Ulster for a period of years. To this the Tories will respond by demanding that Ulster’s entrance must depend upon its own decision, and on this the negotiation will come to an end. Whether Asquith will then force his Bill through remains to be seen. The King will not veto it against the advice of Ministers.”
His Majesty’s steadiness and constitutional action make part of the history of this period. I wrote Maurice:
London,
18th December, 1913.
“I saw O’Brien last night, and am taking him to-day to meet Bonar, but this can only turn out a disappointment.
I was told by Max that the Tories would not agree to anything except the exclusion of Ulster, with its right to “stay out” until it wished to come in. This is said to be Carson’s final determination, but Lord Lansdowne may force a compromise on the hotheads.”
The late Lord Lansdowne acted as a moderator in the struggle. He was sagacious in managing his property in Kerry, where his house at Derreen, he thought, commanded the finest prospect in the world, whether by sea or land. He was devoted to Ireland, and only wanted peace. His house there was burnt in 1922, and he rebuilt it in 1926. The clergy secured the recovery of much of the furniture when the revolt fizzled out.
I wrote my brother:
Chapelizod,
Christmas Day, 1913.
“Bourke Cochrane, of New York, who has been seeing T. P. O’Connor, tells Moreton Frewen that T.P., Dillon and Redmond have informed Asquith of their acquiescence in Partition.
Devlin holds out, and therefore, if he persists, the Bill must be killed, and the Government along with it - because we could not vote for anything of that kind.
T.P., in his American letter, foreshadowed the abandonment of Ireland’s claim to the Post Office, a fortnight before Asquith spoke on the subject.
Churchill tells his Tory friends that he will resign rather than consent to the “coercion” of Ulster.
I fear Carson’s bluff will win. If so, there will be nothing for it, except that the Government should dissolve, and then the Tories may be in office before 12 months.
The Daily Chronicle announced recently that the Welsh Disestablishment Bill would be taken first next session. I did not believe this until I heard of the surrender to Ulster. It is a pretty situation for Redmond.”
No one knew from day to day what to believe. The “jellyfishness” of Redmond was, of course, a constant factor. I wrote:
Chapelizod,
5th January, 1914.
“The Evening Mail states that the Liberals intend to limit to 10 years the exclusion of four Ulster counties. T.P.’s American letter raised no objection to anything except “permanent exclusion.”
Now they are in a hole after Asquith’s speech accepting Carson’s propositions.
Murphy says his editor told him that our people were so sick of waiting they would take anything.”
London,
15th January, 1914.
“The Conference has been fruitless. Bonar Law speaks to-night. The conversations were not private, and I understand they are not to be kept secret.
Asquith offered to withdraw the Post Office, the Customs and the Judges, and to give Ulster local autonomy, but Bonar declined, after consulting his colleagues.
Lord Portsmouth consults me as to “franchise” points, and is in touch with Lord Lansdowne, and sometimes sees the King.
They might postpone the operation of the Bill until the 1st January, 1916, on the ground that a General Election must take place in the interval, and that the second reading was less catastrophic than civil war, and then make changes, including the eviscerations which Asquith offered Bonar Law.
This would embarrass Redmond, and it adds a fresh stumbling-block.
T.P. told Bourke Cochrane that they had agreed to the exclusion of Ulster, and that it was Devlm’s resistance prevented the offer being formally made.
Moreton Frewen says Winston is perturbed, and did not agree that Asquith was on his side against Lloyd George. He said Winston had no support in the Cabinet except, perhaps, Grey, and John Burns, and that Lulu Harcourt hated him.
If he resigned the Admiralty, the Sea Lords would resign with him, but I don’t believe he will do so.”
It was a time of confusion and indecision, and Ireland was a cockpit for British parties. I wrote:
London,
19th January, 1914.
You and I are inn agreement that the Tories would part with their electoral “bread and butter” if they consented to any compromise over Home Rule. They are split over Tariff Reform, and have only “Ulster” to unite them, but O’Brien is so intense that he will not see this, and thinks the Tories should have a “Round Table.”
Such a Conference could only be successful in dishing them. Yet O’Brien is of the mid-Victorian opinion that Ireland occupies a place of importance in English minds.
The mass of the English regard the question as practically settled. Ireland is “hoff,” as the waiters say, with politicians unless they can use it mechanically, as Carson is doing, by threatening civil war.
The fact that he has to make such a threat to arouse interest is the best proof that the English would not otherwise care about Ireland.
I see nothing to stop the Government going through the session as usual.
Churchill is to have his way about the Navy, and if he did not, he and the Sea Lords would resign, and this the Government could not face. His demand is for four extra Dreadnoughts, of which three are to replace those promised to Canada. For this he has an unanswerable case from the Cabinet standpoint, as he was allowed last year to send a memorandum to the Canadian premier, Borden, urging the necessity for the ships.
He is therefore only asking for one battleship more than was declared necessary last year. He paid Lloyd George a visit on Saturday, and I was told Asquith was on his side as to the Navy. Once he gets his way as to this his views about Ulster will undergo modification.
The Times on Saturday said Carson would review three regiments of 3,000 (or 3,500) men each. The Sunday Times yesterday gave the number as 3,500 all told, and said that none of them had rifles. The Daily Mail to-day says that this recruiting has stopped officially, as he has got the 100,000 he requires!
Carson’s influence has acted as a safety-valve for the Orangemen, as they would have got up sporadic riots, if left to themselves! The situation depends on whether Asquith has the nerve to meet them unflinchingly.
Dillon last week complained in Dublin of Birrell’s absence from Ireland, and his neglect of the situation, especially as regards Larkin!
O’Brien is right in his view that if Redmond had been conciliatory at the outset, and offered some representation and power to the Orangemen, the present situation would not have arisen.”
I again wrote:
London,
26th January, 1914.
“An Englishman (nephew of a peer) said to me there would be civil war in England as well as in Ireland, and that Willoughby do Broke and his men would ride up to London and attack Asquith, and that the soldiers would not resist I I never heard such dire threats.
He said the railways would be cut, and the telegraphs torn down, on the ground that Asquith obtained the ” Parliament Act,” with a pledge that he would reform the House of Lords and establish a Second Chamber, before the Home Rule Bill was passed, and that this is what the electors understood at the General Election of 1910.
Now, they protest that he has jockeyed them, at Redmond’s instance. I was astonished at this vehemence, and his belief that Asquith would be funked.
James Campbell says Ulster would form a “provisional government” the day the Home Rule Bill became law, and that the Belfast Protestants would never allow themselves to be ruled from Dublin. I asked if he thought the British would allow them to seize the Custom House in Belfast, and he said their men would take it and get shot down, and that the moment Protestant blood was shed Asquith’s life would not be worth much! They are relying on funking the Ministry. Will they succeed? With Birrell in charge, anything is possible.
It is evident there will be a hornet’s nest in Down and Antrim, which will be stirred up to influence English opinion on the Tory side. Some of them hope to get the King to veto the Bill, although this was not the wish of the more responsible. Yet as the time draws near I fancy the extremists’ views will prevail. If they can get Lord Lansdowne and Bonar Law so to advise the King no one can tell the result.
They are holding meetings all over England. Things will be at fever heat in the House of Commons before long, and it is in that atmosphere the session will go on, down to the date when the Home Rule Bill receives its third reading. If in the Orange crucible things have been made red-hot in Parliament, His Majesty may, they think, require an election before appending his signature.
Besides, the weakness of ministers must be reckoned with. The by-elections may determine Ireland’s fate. The most interesting feature will be whether Asquith will crystallize his offers to Bonar Law into “suggestions” for Lords’ amendments.”
Ulstermen declared they would not abide by the ballot or Acts of Parliament, but would make themselves a nuisance unless they got their way, just as Trade Unions threatened to suspend communication, or cut off fuel. The tactics pursued by British miners on strike found resemblance in the politics of 1914. Northern extremists (professing the utmost loyalty to the King and the Union Jack) announced they would prefer the rule of the Kaiser to that of a Dublin Parliament. The Liberal Cabinet, which was carrying a heavy cargo in English and Welsh politics, was unsteadied. I wrote:
London,
31st January, 1914.
“One cannot always keep saying that the finance of the Home Rule Bill is putrid. I said so once!
As to Bonar Law, I noticed while we were discussing politics last Sunday that Max differed from his Civil War conclusion in a way which I believe represented the English Tory view.
Yesterday Lord Hugh Cecil said that Home Rule without Civil War would be better than Home Rule with Civil War, which I think was a stroke at Carson.
James Campbell spoke of Southern Protestants being engaged in barricading their houses and getting ready for defence. They have raised the devil and cannot lay him, but Belfast is the danger core.
Campbell’s interest is distinct from Carson’s, as he spoke of himself as having the guardianship of the Southern Unionists.
The worst of the situation is that it will be handled (like the Larkin strike) by stranger-fools, instead of by native resolutes. Dublin Castle created Larkin, and if Home Rule passes, its dispositions in Ulster will be idiotic. The soldiers will have no heart in the business, and the heads of the police still less.
God save Ireland from Birrell as Chief Secretary, if there is going to be trouble.”
Keeping as I did on friendly terms with Conservatives as well as Liberals, I was often entrusted with their political confidences; I disbelieved in Redmond’s grit or Dillon’s judgment, and hovered sometimes on the outskirts of both English camps in order to seek an opening in which some settlement for Ireland could be wangled.
I wrote my brother:
London,
10th February, 1914.
“The Party are in a fix - or rather, would be, if the Opposition had skill. In spite of Asquith’s speech pointing to the exclusion of Ulster, their speakers thundered in a dull way to save their faces.
I made a speech last night intended to be satirical, which has been the subject of praise by Liberals, and as the result, Asquith came up and shook hands with me as I was sitting by the fire in the Library at 7.30, quite unaware of his presence.
I asked him were they going to exclude Ulster, and he said not, but I do not believe this. The Party received him without cheers as he rose, and in silence as he sat down. They were collapsed, having evidently been told by Redmond at their meeting previously, what had been communicated to him in Downing Street last week.
Max Aitken outwitted the Press as to the interviews with Bonar at his house in Surrey, which Asquith spoke of, and received a letter of thanks for his arrangements!
The offer made to Bonar was to drop the Post Office and the Customs, and give Ulster a Council with supreme control over police, education, and judiciary. The Liberals say the question is practically settled!
T.P. told Max to-night that he always said the question would be “settled by consent”! I met Carson as I was leaving the House, and strongly remonstrated with him as to the line he was taking. He was quite reasonable and good-natured over it.
A Liberal muttered to me that the King will not sign the Bill unless Ulster is excluded! Carson is trying to get the best terms he can for the general body of the “loyalists.” He could not speak to-night, as he has neuritis.
I have been passing the word to the Tories to be moderate, but Austen Chamberlain was fierce. Nevertheless, the Irish Party sat silent, and Redmond smiled feebly. They are routed, as far as I can see, but things change continually, and it may be in the end some other composition will be accepted.
It is not the occasion for sectional moralizing, and we should not drive Redmond to despair. O’Brien has been so badly treated that he may take a more personal line. My mind has been influenced by Knox towards the view presented by Carson, that if the “stage-fright stage” is overcome, the North might join us voluntarily, but otherwise would never do so.
The settlement of the Eastern Question has taken hundreds of years, and when Bulgaria saw victory within her grasp it was snatched from her. If the division of Ireland were to be permanent I would not agree, no matter what result followed; but one cannot help being affected by the thought that it would be possible to secure a better Bill for the rest of Ireland, and that afterwards the North would join us
What the Ulstermen want is something to “save their face”; and if they had been met by a policy like O’Brien’s they would be now reasonable.”
I made at this period a speech to a Tory Club (at Moreton Frewen’s request), and beforehand had a chat with the ablest and most genial of the Belfast members, the late James Chambers, K.C., afterwards Tory Solicitor-General. He agreed with me that Asquith’s Home Rule Bill held no portent of danger to his co-religionists, and I tried to persuade him that he should in derision of the measure move to alter its title to “Local Government (Ireland) Bill Number III.” Carson, however, was other-minded.
I wrote Maurice:
London,
11th February, 1914.
“My impression is that the exclusion of Ulster will be proposed by the Government, and accepted by Redmond. To-night Dillon cheered Lloyd George very pointedly at a passage which showed that this would be the plan. I expect they are either concealing the situation from Devlin, or that he has not the parliamentary instinct to discern what is being arranged, if he has not also surrendered.
Lloyd George’s speech to-night was delivered after consultation with T.P. He said Carson’s speech made a new situation because he referred to Redmond as his “countryman"" He also buttered Carson enormously.
I believe all has been arranged behind the scenes. Bonar Law’s speech affords proof of this. Last night a pressman told me that the Liberals were saying everything had been arranged, but I told him it was not true. Now I think the other way.
It is a pity O’Brien was not here. There never was such an occasion from our point of view. I could have struck in and destroyed Redmond, who opened the door for surrender to Ulster. Carson knows the outcry that will be raised by the Southern Unionists if this settlement is accepted.
Possibly the thing may end in the House of Lords altering the Bill which, as it now is, is doomed. I fancy the next few weeks will be spent in discovering a “formula” for Redmond to couch on!”
O’Brien disliked attending the House of Commons, and scarcely had patience to sit on its benches. This was a drawback, as the scene there shifted from hour to hour and much could be done by personal conference. I wrote Maurice:
London,
13th February, 1914.
“Dillon is going about talking to the Liberals in favour of the exclusion of Ulster. They all know that but for Devlin it would be arranged.
Dillon has been saying the contrary up to this. He now says, “How can we coerce Ulster with our own record against coercion? ” and that we cannot face Civil War as a beginning to Home Rule. The Party are in a state of collapse.
It is said the King insisted on the paragraph in the Address about “conciliation,” and that when a Minister objected, His Majesty said, ” It is my speech. Surely I can say this much” - or words to that effect.
Devlin cannot give in, but I see Dillon arguing with him constantly. Lord Roberts said in the Lords last night that no officer would fight Ulster, but that they would not disobey orders, and would resign. Several hundred Army officers sent a round-robin to the King declaring they would resign if asked to attack the Ulstermen.”
All Parties leant on the Monarch for advice, and His Majesty naturally consulted the “elder statesmen.” Of this I conveyed to my brother:
House of Commons,
17th February, 1914.
“The King lunched with Balfour to-day, and spent a couple of hours with him over the Irish question. He also had been consulting Rosebery, and it is evident this counts.
The Government have not made up their mind one way or the other. One of their counter-plans was to propose a, “Home Rule within Home Rule” for Ulster. That would make the Bill more unpalatable for the Redmondites, and drive them into accepting “exclusions.”
Home Rule for Ulster would breed a set of officials with vested interests, whom it would be hard to dislodge. It would be like the townships around Dublin.”
Weeks were spent in negotiations. On the 9th March, 1914, on the Second Reading of the Bill, now in its third year (to secure the application of the Parliament Act), the Prime Minister again threw out suggestions for the exclusion of Ulster.
He began by saying that he saw no hope of a conference to solve the antagonism between Northern and Southern opinion; and indicated that at least for a limited period the whole of the Ulster counties should be excluded.
Bonar Law declared he listened to this with interest and pleasure.”
I wrote Maurice:
London,
12th March, 1914.
“Apparently Devlin was not persuaded by Lloyd George yesterday and from the tone of the Daily News and Chronicle to-day, there will be no further offer from the Government. My speech has compelled them to nail their colours to the mast.
Duke, K.C., came to me to say that it was one of the finest ever made. This praise from such a man would be absurd if it were not sincere and spontaneous. I met him by chance. Anyhow, it had the effect of keeping the Liberals solid against further concessions to the Orangemen.”
On the 19th March, 1914, Bonar Law moved a vote of censure, regretting the refusal of the Government to formulate suggestions for the amendment of the Home Rule Bill. The Curragh mutiny then occurred, through the attempt to “feel the pulses” of the officers privately, instead of giving them orders to march - which they would have obeyed.
I wrote my brother:
London,
25th March, 1914.
“Seely, the War Minister, and Lloyd George are dissatisfied with the situation.
The retirement of Carson and his friends to Belfast last week (which has not been so far explained) is said to be due to knowledge of the truth of the rumours of the intention to proceed against them. There had been a conference at the Irish Office with the Fighting Services, and the Chief Secretary, It is asserted that the decision arrived at (which determined Carson) was to arrest him and 50 others, and to raid the offices of his League in London and in Ireland.”
In a later letter I added:
“When Carson left for Belfast the Government summoned the Irish Commander-in-Chief, Paget on Thursday. Seely gave him instructions as to proposed action. Paget returned to Ireland and called his officers together, telling them there would be a blaze on Saturday. General Gough then refused to agree to march, and so did some others he consulted. Paget was summoned to London.
By this time, not knowing the temper of the officers at the Curragh, Churchill ordered war vessels to sail and Lloyd George went to Huddersfield to back up the proposed action. When General Paget apprised the Army Council of the temper of the officers they summoned Gough to London, and Seely demanded that he should be cashiered. The Army Council declined, as they said officers at Aldershot would mutiny if officers in Ireland were degraded.
Then Seely began to realize the seriousness of the situation, and told Asquith what was going on. Asquith quailed, because he had been worked on by Lord Roberts and the Archbishop of Canterbury. The King remained neutral, and there is no truth in the yarn put forward in the Freeman and Independent against His Majesty, alleging that he acted in a partisan way. On the contrary, the Tories complained of the neutrality of the King.
The next thing was that Asquith threw over Churchill, Seely and Lloyd George and refused to back up their action. He told Seely to go to Gough and square matters with him somehow. Seely tried this before the House met yesterday, but Gough would not be squared, unless he had a written guarantee that he would not be asked to serve against Ulster. Seely first got a formula drawn up that Gough would not be asked to act except in case of “civil commotion,” but this did not suit Gough. Finding that nothing else could be done, Seely authorized Sir John French to give Gough this assurance in writing.
When I spoke last night (my speech is not reported in the Irish Press) I mentioned the rumour that Gough left for Ireland with this assurance, and it turns out to be true. The debate to-morrow will hinge on this document, and it may be that Seely will be driven to resign, or that other members of the Government (if Asquith stands by Seely) may go. Rumours allege that Lloyd George may resign, in order to head the populace against the Army and the aristocrats! It seems impossible that the Government can carry on if the White Paper to-morrow confirms any part of these rumours.
Lying there must be, but under the influence of debate some gleams of truth must emerge.
Last night the Government seemed dished, but to-day Asquith’s device extricated them from what appeared to be a hopeless position. The impression left on my mind is that the incident, instead of doing the Government harm, will serve it with the masses of the people, and tend to bring about a rapprochement with the Labour Party.
The moment the Government showed that the Cabinet was not responsible for Seely, that moment the situation was saved with their own men, who were yesterday loud in protest. The English public don’t take up things with the same quickness as ours, and it may be supposed that the crisis is not over. In my opinion it is, unless the Tories get the officers to resign afresh. The spirit in the House against the officers was tremendous, and this cannot but affect the Army.”
I have not compared the assertions in these letters with the records of the time, and print them only as thumbnail sketches. A further comment ran:
London,
26th March, 1914.
“As no one now believes the newspapers on either side, I let you know my opinion of the upshot of the debate last night. It is: That the Government have emerged from it with the loss of a few tail-feathers, but substantially uninjured; and that the Home Rule Bill will become law.
The Tories may organize a further mutiny in the Army, and it may be that the officers in Ireland will persist in resigning; but nothing struck me more than the extraordinary and historic determination of the Radicals to face the Army crisis at all hazards, although it might have brought down the Government. This sprang chiefly from the Labour Members, John Ward in the first place, but soon the entire Government Party caught fire.
No doubt the Ministry are lying, but they lied principally to save their faces with the Court, and not because they disagreed with the sentiments of the rank and file. They have not told a tithe of the truth, but if it should be dragged from them it will not discredit them with the electors, because it is clear that their supporters are far in advance of themselves. They lie to placate Ulster and the Front Opposition Bench, but the mass of the Liberals want war against these elements, and would welcome it. The Ministry, in fact, lags behind its supporters, and can do nothing extreme enough for them.
We who lived through the Gladstonian epoch are troglodytes compared with the Liberals of to-day. They would rejoice at a crisis with the Army, or with the Ulstermen, and think the Government have gone too far in concession and moderation.
Redmond insisted, in return for agreeing to the “exclusion” proposal, that some demonstration should be made in Ulster, and that, even if warrants of arrest were not in course of preparation, Churchill and Seely should make some show of force to overawe the Belfast volunteers, or compel the acceptance of the six years’ exclusion.”
A Labour member, John Ward, had made an attack on the intrigue of the Army against parliamentary decisions. It was not only powerful, but persuasive, and wrought a great effect. Ward, originally a navvy, was of such strength that in his youth he held up a cofferdam with his shoulders in some harbour to allow his mates to escape. He was the parliamentary hero of the Carson crisis.